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Abstract
Following the deaths in custody of Adam Rickwood and Gareth Myat following Restrictive 
Physical Intervention, and the UK government’s refusal to ban these instruments, it is 
incumbent upon us to investigate how use of these techniques may be obviated.   
Conventional methodologies are founded on a binary opposition that sets agency over 
against structure. Lack of coherence in the expression of these concepts permits 
research methods based on them to be less than fully coherent in their foundations. A 
coherent methodological foundation will be advanced which alleviates these problems. 
This position presents human behaviour as the product of constrained will. This paper 
will advance an outline of a research strategy designed to investigate the processes 
leading to violent constraint of children jail.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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Concern has arisen in the UK over the use of Restrictive Physical Intervention 
(RPI, also referred to as “pain compliance techniques”) in Young Offender and Secure 
Training Institutions. This concern is attendant upon the deaths in custody in 2004 of 
Adam Rickwood and Gareth Myatt following or during the infliction by officers of RPI 
techniques, and the subsequent Carlile Report (Howard League for Penal Reform 2006) 
and Smallridge and Williamson’s (2008) review of the use of RPIs in children’s
i jails. 
Despite criticism from the European Court of Human Rights (2004), the Appeal Court’s 
ruling in July 2008 that these techniques are unlawful (Guardian 16
th December 2008) 
and the above reports’ condemnation of their use, the UK Government continues to 
support them
ii. In this case, where the UK Government shows no sign of banning these 
instruments of control, it is necessary that we investigate means through which their use 
might be obviated. Sparks, Bottoms, and Hay’s (1995) Prisons and the Problem of Order
is taken by many to be the “current state of the art in British penological thinking” 
(Bosworth, 1999:3) on the social production of (dis)order and its constraint in prisons, 
however, there are certain problems with its methodological assumptions that make it 
less than effective in terms of identifying the processes that bring about the events that 
necessitate the use of RPIs or the constraint of practices that escalate situations to the 
point where the use of RPIs become necessary. The methodological position taken by 
Sparks and his colleagues is, by and large, to be found in Giddens’ Structuration Theory 
(1979 & 1986). This perspective suggests that notions of human freedom and creativity 
can be encapsulated in the concept ‘agency’, and that this concept is set over against 
the concept ‘structure’ which constrains agency. It is further suggested agency and 
structure are mutually instantiated through the recursive practices of agents. I do not 
wish to explore the mutually constituting nature of these concepts, but I do wish to point 
out that there is a problem with the concept agency, and thus, by implication with the 
picture offered of its involvement with the structuring of social collectivities. If this is the 
case, then we might reasonably assume that these problems are present in Sparks, 
Bottoms and Hay’s study, and indeed they are represented in the picture of negotiation 
of agency which Sparks et al take from Beetham (1991). The problem here is that if the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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possession of agency is negotiable in what Giddens (1982) has called the “dialectic of 
control”, then the successful negotiator must be in possession of agency in order to 
“win” the negotiation (in other words, not be constrained in the negotiation by the 
powerful with whom he is in negotiation). This, of course means, that negotiation of the 
possession of agency is unnecessary, since successful negotiation presupposes that the 
successful negotiator already be in possession of agency. The reason that agency 
presents this kind of problem will be explored below.
What I intend to do toward the end of this essay is to outline a data collection 
method that will reveal the processes that lead to the use of RPIs in child jails. To do this 
I will first lay out a new methodological foundation that takes care of the problems 
surrounding the concept ‘agency’, therefore I will begin by illuminating the problem of 
the concept agency as it pertains to the description of the structuring of social 
interaction and institutions. I will go on to outline a methodological foundation that takes 
human social behaviour to be the product of constrained will; I will consequently briefly 
describe a phenomenological account of Will that bears upon the work of Heidegger and 
Derrida. Clearly we can will for ourselves far more than we can achieve, which means 
that our will is constrained, and that means, in turn, that someone has the power to 
constrain us. I shall therefore outline a perspective of social structures that accounts for 
this power to constrain, that rests upon the work of Deleuze and Guattari, and of 
DeLanda. I shall go on to suggest that this power is exercised in social situations 
linguistically (in part) in terms – following Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) – of what 
words can do. I shall then briefly outline a data collection method that makes use of 
these insights concerning words and their capacities as they find expression in 
Conversation Analysis (Sacks 1995 & passim) to investigate the processes that lead to 
the use of violent restraint in our child jails.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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The Problem of Agency
The concept agency is usually set over against the concept ‘structure’. In this 
duality/dualism, agency represents an attempt to capture the freedom from determinism 
that writers have claimed is inherent in human behaviour. That is, it is claimed that we 
are free to act in ways that conceptions reifying structure do not permit. In some 
accounts agency merely equates to action, in others it is bound up with notions of free 
will. In either case, the conception is reliant upon completed actions as evidence of its 
existence – if one is taken to be unable to do a thing, one is taken not to have agency in 
that regard. This is not to say that this is untrue, to be sure, if agency is that concept 
that speaks of concerns regarding the failure of structures to constrain us, then should 
those structures constrain us we are not possessed of that quality which expresses our 
freedom from such constraint. However, a major problem with the concept agency arises 
not when we consider what it means to be constrained and therefore not in possession of 
it, but when we consider what it means to say that we are in possession of it.
For Giddens, agency equates to action (1986:55) and thus is a ‘stream of … 
causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world’ 
(ibid. My emphasis). We are possessed of agency when we act in a way that exhibits the 
capacity to have acted otherwise (ibid:56) either through positive intervention or 
through forbearance. In other words we have agency when we are not the subject of 
coercion or constraint. In sociological terms, the notions of coercion and constraint are 
elements of determination. This locution ‘could have done otherwise’ presents us with a 
serious problem. To suggest that someone could have done otherwise is to suggest that 
they could have chosen to do otherwise, that is, their choice was in no way coerced or 
constrained (determined) and thus, conventionally, the agent has free will. 
The public, policy-makers, and, indeed a significant quantity of criminologists 
might feel that the criminal (for want of a better word) is perfectly free to choose 
between committing a crime or going peacefully to the ball game. However, it is far from Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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clear what we might be saying if, having chosen to commit a crime, we say that the
criminal could have chosen to go to the ball game. The phrase “could have done 
otherwise” is problematic because it suggests free will means having the ability to 
choose without constraint or determination. When we think of constraint, the matter is 
moderately straightforward, I can think of many physical constraints upon my choice to 
commit a crime or go to the ball game – there may be no tickets left, or they may be too 
expensive; the house I was intending to burgle has an alarm or is occupied or has a high 
wall. However, when we speak of the absence of determination the matter is somewhat 
more difficult. If we say we are free to choose, I suspect what we really mean is that “to 
all intents and purposes” we feel free to choose. However, the requirement of the 
technical concept agency is that we exhibit free will in the technical sense – the 
commonsense usage won’t do – technically, we must be free to choose in an 
environment where we could have done otherwise, that is the choices must be ours, and 
we must be free of any determination, or constraint, and that means all determination or 
constraint. This presents us with a problem, because if the choices are ours (agent 
causation
iii) ‘[t]he cause of the volition is the man that willed it’ (Reid 1969:88). That is, 
it didn’t “just happen”, I caused the choice – I determined it. If it had just happened, 
then, of course, my burgling the house would be inexplicable, and it would be unclear 
how I could speak of having chosen. However, if I choose to burgle the house it is also 
unclear how such a choice might be free, since it is I who determines it, and freedom 
must be free of all and any determination. Thus, the idea that we might be “free to 
choose” seems to show us that the locution “free will” is an oxymoron since choice is a 
kind of determination and freedom cannot in any way be determined. This has led 
several writers to believe that the notion of freedom in “free will” is incoherent 
(Strawson 1986), incompatible with things that we take to be true of this world 
(Peerboom 2001), or that we simply cannot speak in any meaningful way about free will 
or free choice (Nagel 1987). Indeed, agency, expressed in the above way looks more like 
a description of “power” than “free will”, in that it appears merely to equate to capacity 
or “can”. The problem lies with the concept agency’s reliance on the notion of freedom. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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If we remove the requirement for freedom and concentrate not on “free will” but merely 
upon “will”, then we are able to situate people’s motivations, their choices concerning 
their future selves, within the greater world of their pasts, presents and futures in a way 
which agency cannot do: we can locate human behaviour as an emergent property of 
constrained will. This problem of agency leaves us with the need for a different 
methodological foundation upon which to ground our decisions concerning methods of 
investigation. I now turn to the task of briefly outlining such a methodological position 
that takes human social behaviour as being the product of constrained will, and thus, I 
begin with an account of will.
Will
iv
Following the above, we appear not to be able to talk about human motivation or 
people’s choices if we rely on the concept agency. If we are entirely free to choose, then 
we cannot speak of having choice, because choosing is a form of determination and 
therefore not free. The locution “free choice” is seen to be an oxymoron. So, what we 
need to do is to get rid of the notion of freedom as a pre-requisite. If we do this then we 
have to situate our choices or the choices of others within their complex pasts, presents, 
and futures, and the concept that permits us to do this is the concept, “will”. This is 
possible because we can speak of people having will without having to talk about 
freedom at all; we know that we can have will to do something and still not be free to do 
it, whereas we cannot have agency and be constrained from fulfilling it. So, what we 
might say in place of the idea that structure denies agency, is that human behaviour is a 
property emergent from constrained will. It is important to note, however, that whilst we 
can readily imagine that our will can be constrained after we have it, it can also be 
constrained before we have it, in that it is not possible for us simply to will anything for 
ourselves. What we will for ourselves must be limited by our imagination, and our 
imagination can be limited in many different ways. This is akin to what Foucault calls an 
‘historical a priori’. (1970: xxiv)
v  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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What I want to do is to talk about having will towards ourselves as being a part of the 
nature of Human Being. When we talk about being as a person we usually talk about 
being here: that is, we say that we are self present. We talk about being me – self 
identity: that is, we talk about being that person who is me. We talk about being human: 
that is, we say that I satisfy all the requirements (I am in possession of all the necessary 
predicates) of being human – when we do this, we also suggest that being means being 
complete. However, none of these ideas answers the question: What is Being? This is the 
question addressed by Heidegger in ‘Being and Time’ (1996 [1926])
For Heidegger, being is unavoidably bound up with being in the world with others. 
The human world is characterised by ‘care’.  Care, for Heidegger is very similar to 
Levinas’ ‘responsibility’ or Dostoevsky’s ‘guilt’, we cannot avoid having it towards other 
people: it is an ineluctable part of what it is to be a human being.  For Heidegger, 
humans are unique in their way of being in the world by virtue of their ability to 
comprehend, or enquire about the nature of that being. Thus humans are those beings 
which (following from Husserl 1976 [1913]) can represent to themselves their own 
being.  This is the basis of ‘reflexivity’: we can imagine ourselves as ourselves. Because 
we can perceive ourselves in the world and we can represent to ourselves others like us, 
we can perceive what it is like to be someone else: we care about them says Heidegger, 
we are bound up with (‘concernful’ about 1996:154, 167, 311 & passim) their fate.  
Dasein, Heidegger’s word for Human Being – ‘Being there’ – means being in the world
with, and caring about others.
This capacity to represent ourselves to ourselves, and to represent others to 
ourselves means that we can perceive differences between ourselves and others, and it 
is these differences so perceived that give rise to authentic and inauthentic behaviour. 
Sometimes we perceive the differences between ourselves and others and we try to be 
like them: what Heidegger calls the ‘they self’. This is inauthentic behaviour. When we 
realize that our lives are finite, that, as Heidegger puts it, we become aware of ‘the 
possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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every way of existing’ (1996:307)  we also come to realize that our lives are full of 
possibilities. This makes us choose to be unlike others: this is authentic behaviour. So 
Heidegger claims that our colonisation of the future involves having will towards 
ourselves as objects of the future and that our passage to that future has qualities of 
‘thrownness
vi’ or ‘facticity’ (we are determined by our pasts), and ‘projection’ (we choose 
and act upon our own future in an authentic way).
Will and Supplementation
The question arises, then, how we act upon our will towards ourselves to become
this object of the future. Here I wish to appeal to the work of Derrida. Derrida’s primary 
concerns are with the nature of communication, and it is therefore unsurprising that he 
is not frequently the first port of call for criminologists in their search for a solution to 
their problems. Nonetheless, Derrida’s method of deconstruction, and his critique of 
authority based upon logocentrism, and notions of the completeness of self-presence, 
present criminologists with a critical tool of significant utility particularly in relation to the 
law, but indeed with regard to any topoi of authority or plenitude. It is the notion of self-
presence as plenitude, bound up in conventional ways of thinking about being, with 
which I wish to take issue. Derrida takes on these issues of logocentrism and self-
presence in a critique of ‘Essay on the Origin of Languages’ of Rousseau (Derrida 1978). 
This particular turn is of significance to the current project in that it deals with 
Rousseau’s notion of the supplement, and I wish to introduce the idea of becoming (as 
we find in Nietzsche, rather than being) being achieved by the adoption of supplements 
to our existing selves. For Rousseau, writing is a supplement to speech. Derrida, in an 
earlier section of ‘Of Grammatology’(1976) revealed the ‘classical’ distinction between 
pure and innocent nature, and the impure imposition of culture present in the work of 
Levi-Strauss
vii, where Strauss equates the imposition of culture with the deleterious 
effects of the imposition of writing over the pure nature of speech
viii. ‘Thus we are led 
back to Rousseau: the ideal profoundly underlying this philosophy of writing is therefore 
the image of a community immediately present to itself, without difference, a community Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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of speech where all the members are in earshot’ (Derrida 1976 op. cit., 136). In 
Rousseau, however, writing is not merely violence, but necessary: it is a necessary 
supplement. The question arises therefore, what is this writing a supplement to? The 
answer that Rousseau provides is that it restores the presence of the writer. Derrida, 
however, maintains that this is a supplement fulfilling some lack in nature (Ibid., 146-7): 
the adoption of the supplement makes visible an original deficiency. ‘[T]here is lack in 
Nature and that because of that very fact something is added to it … the supplement 
comes naturally to put itself in Nature’s place’ (Ibid., 149). Thus writing is ‘required’ by 
nature and thus must be considered as ‘inscribed in the origin of language as such’ 
(Smith 2005). What this means for our current discussion is that in the face of notions of 
the correlation between absence and alterity
ix, the failure of notions of presence founded 
in logocentrism, present us with the impossibility of completeness of self-presence. That 
is, presence itself depends upon supplementation. Thus, if, as Bergson (1992) points 
out, no two states are ever the same for humans, the self of the future must be achieved 
by adopting some kind of supplement to the existing self: the supplement fulfils a lack in 
nature – it is required to complete the self-presence of the future object. (I shall suggest 
that we are assemblages of all such supplements as we have adopted in the past.) Thus 
we have will towards ourselves as an object of the future, which object is conditioned by 
our phenomenological engagement in a world of others and we attempt to adopt 
supplements to our existing selves in order to become that object of the future. In this 
case it will be apparent that we cannot always fulfil that which we will for ourselves, and 
therefore, it must be true that someone has the power to constrain our adoption of 
supplements. It is thus necessary to examine how this power comes about. I shall 
suggest, in line with Deleuze and Guattari that power to do things emerges from 
processes of assemblage. It is thus appropriate that I outline what we mean when we 
use the term assemblage where social structures or collectivities are concerned.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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Assemblage
x
In the foregoing I have outlined what I take to be a serious problem with the 
concept agency and have suggested the adoption of the older concept ‘will’ as expressed 
in the phenomenological tradition, and suggested that we achieve such will by adopting 
supplements to our existing selves. I suggested earlier that rather than the 
methodological foundation that sets agency over against structure, we should view 
human social behaviour as being the outcome of constrained will. It is necessary, then, 
that I now look at the constraint side of the coin.
Totalities and Interiority
The persistent, dominant view of social structure that it is a whole – a totality –
made up of parts. Those parts have been taken to be its various institutions and other 
collections of individuals, such as government, police, army, health service, educational 
institutions, civil service, unions, clubs, families, companies and so on. The society thus 
formed is a whole; it is the sum of all its parts, and each of those parts has certain 
properties which delimit their function in maintaining the whole. Thus, on this view, if we 
take away one of these elements, the society is no longer whole. Each element in this 
kind of picture of society exists in a reciprocal relationship with its neighbours that is
dependent upon the properties of each element. These relationships so conceived are 
referred to as “relations of interiority” (DeLanda 2006:9). In this functionalist view, the 
elements of a society exist because they serve a function in sustaining that society as a 
stable whole. However, such a view prohibits any account of phenomena that are not 
reducible to those parts because the whole is no more than the sum of its parts. Why, 
you may ask, is this a problem? If we imagine our police as being constituted by the 
properties (aligned with functions) of the individual policemen, how do we conceive of 
roles or functions or properties, or indeed a functioning whole in the absence of one of 
them through sickness let’s say? First, we might suggest that the police force is no 
longer whole. This would mean that it was no longer fully functional. However, we know Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
2009, Vol 1(2), 1-32                                                       Beyond Agency and Structure
11
that the sick officer’s colleagues will alter their properties (their function – what they do) 
to accommodate the absent officer. We would then have to say one of two things; either 
the policemen had been surplus to requirements – in other words he served no function 
and therefore was not a part of the functioning whole, or the force is not whole now: 
there is one policeman missing. Either this is the case or the force’s function must have 
changed. What this means is that views that reduce structures merely to the sum of 
their parts – that view societies as totalities – can have no account of change.  Clearly 
the world is not fixed and does change and thus we need an account that permits 
change. We might say that the societies are not in a state of being but in a process of 
becoming.
Assemblages and Exteriority
The dominant challenge to this view of societies comes from assemblage theory. 
What have been conceived of as wholes are here conceived of as assemblages of 
entities, the relationships between entities are held to be products of their capacities
(what they can do) and the relationships are referred to as “relationships of exteriority” 
(DeLanda 2006:10). Whereas in the old view, the dominant metaphor invoked the 
various functions (properties) of the organs of the body and their relationship to other 
functions of other parts, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) conceive of assemblages of 
different species. Symbiotic relationships such as that between bees and plants are 
based upon the capacities of each. Whilst it is true that the relationship is functionally 
necessary to the well-being of plant and insect, it is merely contingently so: the bee and 
the plant have come to rely on one another’s capacities through evolution, and at some 
point in the future this assemblage will cease to exist in its current form. We can see 
that our absent policeman’s colleagues have the capacity to adapt and cover for his 
absence – the “whole” that had been taken to exist was historically contingent. This view 
deprives conventional organismic theories of their primary metaphor, the whole, 
immutable organism, since the organism’s boundaries are arbitrary. This is because all 
organisms are defined by a process of classification and essentialism: much sociology Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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hitherto has been merely a naming of parts. For example, it is taken that the police force 
is made up of actors whose essence is that they are members of the police force; the 
phylum chordata consists only of creatures with backbones, not because backbones are 
the essence that makes these creatures what they are, but because only creatures with 
backbones have been included. This is called ‘taxonomical essentialism’. Furthermore, 
the organism’s constituents are historically contingent. The view of assemblages as co-
evolutionary relationships of historical contingency means that assemblage is always a 
process: a becoming. Moreover, because elements can be removed as well as inserted 
into the assemblage, assemblages are always unbecomings too. These (dis)assembling 
processes are characterized by movements of intensification and homogenization, or of 
dissipation or heterogenization. These movements are respectively referred to as 
territorialization, and de-territorialization. Thus assemblages have qualities such as 
density, homogeneity, scale, or speed, for example. 
People as Assemblages
Above, I suggested that the constituent parts of an assemblage may be 
assemblages themselves, and, when we consider institutions or other social structures as 
assemblages, then, humans themselves, as their internal elements, may be considered 
simultaneously as assemblages and elements of assemblages. 
Human beings, however, have a particular way of being, so they have a particular 
way of being assemblages. It is taken by many (from Husserl 1976 [1913] inter alia) 
that humans have the capacity to engage with the world in a peculiar way in that, for 
them, there are two kinds of entity – objects and subjects: the latter representing to 
itself the former. As I have pointed out above, this gives humans the capacity to see
themselves as objects; moreover, it gives them the capacity to see themselves as 
objects of the future. That is, they have the capacity to exercise will over their imagined 
becoming. One element of humans as assemblages then, is the capacity to see 
themselves and others as beings, and to see themselves and others as beings of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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past, but they can also see themselves and others as becomings. As I further pointed 
out above, in order to move from the complete beings – the infinitesimally temporal 
totality – of the present, it is axiomatic that they must adopt some currently un-
possessed supplement to their existing selves to complete the being of the immediate 
future. This is because no two states for humans are ever identical, therefore something 
new, something additional must have been added to the being of the present to make 
the being of the new present. We are assemblages of all of these supplements
xi and we 
might refer to our disposition to future additions or supplements as having will towards 
the assemblage that would be produced. We have the capacity to view ourselves as 
objects of the future. Thus we have will to complete ourselves
xii, and we do so by the 
constant adoption of new supplements to our existing assemblages. The problem in the 
social world, however, is that we are not free to choose to see ourselves in any way: 
merely in ways that we can imagine. Imagination, however, is not infinite; it is 
dependent upon our experience of others. Furthermore, we are not free to adopt any 
supplement that we choose from our imagination because there are processes at work 
that have the power to prohibit the adoption of certain supplements that we might
choose. Nonetheless, we may summarize the nature of the human assemblage by saying 
that it is the product of constrained will, where each supplement adopted to satisfy our  
will, past present and future, is an element in that assemblage which is us.
People and Assemblages: When is a Culture?
Because as individuals we are assemblages of all the supplements that we have 
adopted to create new assemblages in our attempts to satisfy our will towards ourselves 
as assemblages of the future, and those supplements and the assemblages that we 
imagine them creating are drawn from our experience, the contiguity of our experiences 
provides the sense of coherence between each of our various perceptions of objects that 
must of necessity be otherwise entirely heterogenous. That is, the coherence of 
‘compossible’
xiii objects which Husserl (1977 [1931]) explains through the 
‘transcendental subject’, for example, rather than being transcendent is immanent in our Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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everyday association one with the other. It is formed in the continuous association of 
ideas through relations of temporality and topicality, their association or negation 
through conceptions of similarity or alterity, our constant association of cause with 
effect. This provides an assemblage capable of making our communal objects 
comprehensible to one another (as individuals) and coherent in relation to one another 
(as objects). This is what we speak of when we speak of a culture: cultures are those 
assemblages of people that permit the coherence of the representation to each other of 
objects or meanings. It is an emergent property of the capacity of the culture to do that 
– that is what the culture does, when the assemblage does this, it is a culture.
Some properties of institutions: Temporality, Density, 
Recursiveness, and Scale
Following from the above, all institutions are cultures and therefore all institutions 
act in ways that tend to homogenize meanings
xiv. We have insisted above that 
assemblages have as one of their qualities, temporality. All assemblages – which all
institutions are – are in the process of becoming and unbecoming, forming and 
dissolving, producing or destroying, appropriating or rejecting: often simultaneously. 
This temporality also means that assemblages or cultures have the property of durability 
or stickiness, or a quality of speed that equates to slowness. Assemblages have as 
another of their qualities density. This is a property that we might associate with 
homogeneity and, the more durable the assemblage the more dense or homogenous it is 
likely to become; the more dense an assemblage, the more dense it is likely to have the 
capacity to become. 
There is one other quality of human assemblages that I should like to introduce, 
and that is the quality which I should call “practiced” or “recursive”. The more ritualised 
(for example) a culture becomes, the more dense it is likely to have the capacity to 
become: the more a group of friends see each other, the more likely they are to have 
the capacity to see more of each other. Old university friendships have a tendency to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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fade away as the extensions that join the assemblage together get stretched and less 
practiced. The reason is this, the less dense the assemblage gets, the less it is capable of 
homogenizing meanings. The less the assemblage is capable of homogenizing meanings, 
the less it is capable it becomes of homogenizing meanings. The less homogenous it is 
the less dense it is, and so on.
Institutions as assemblages also have, of course, the quality of scale. It is 
imperative that we note that they need not have any particular scale, they may possess 
any scale, but scale is a quality possessed by assemblages that is not to be ignored. That 
is, where two or more people interact to begin to homogenize or make comprehensible 
to one another (share) their meanings, we have a culture. We also have cultures that 
consist of many millions of people. Depending which group of meanings we wish to 
select, we can talk about a Chinese culture, for example, and this, of course involves a 
significant proportion of all living humans. In the realm of scales somewhere in between 
friends and humanity, we have assemblages of varying scales some of which we refer to 
as institutions. These institutions – the Home Office, the Fire Brigade, Richmond Borough 
Council, Prison Service, are relatively large, relatively dense, relatively slow, relatively 
recursive and not surprisingly, powerful. Larger, denser, more recursive assemblages 
have the tendency to possess the capacity to increase their power to territorialize: large 
assemblages tend to get larger, because they are more homogenous, and the more 
homogenous an assemblage is, the greater its capacity to homogenize meanings. We 
might say that the assemblage – institution, culture – has the power to homogenize 
meanings, and it is the assembling process from which this power emerges.
Assemblages, Institutions, and Power: Power Equates to Can
Having very briefly sketched some of the qualities of assemblages that involve 
people and characterized them as what we mean when we speak of cultures or 
institutions and their capacity to homogenize meaning, it is now incumbent upon me to 
show why this way of conceiving of institutions is useful in our study of the nature of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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use of RPIs in child jails. There is one other thing, however that we need to do first. 
Earlier I suggested that human conduct can be summarized by saying that it is the 
product of constrained will. If we accept that we have will, then we have to ask: What 
are the (social) mechanisms constraining that will? That is, if we have will and we cannot 
do everything that we will to do (have free will), someone or something has the power to 
stop us doing that thing. The concept ‘power’ has proven to be amongst the most 
slippery concepts in the whole of the social sciences, nonetheless, I shall attempt to 
show briefly, how this concept is illuminated when social collectivities are viewed in 
terms of their capacities rather than their properties: that is, as assemblages.
We have suggested that we can only know what an assemblage is when we know 
what it can do. What something can do is its capacity. Power is about what you can do. 
Assemblages are made of capacities; thus they are made of power in varying degrees, 
that is, “all reality is already a quantity of force” (Deleuze 1983:40). The point here is 
that power is emergent from assemblages. Deleuze and Guattari (1987:399) illustrate 
this notion of the emergence of power from processes of assemblage through the idea of 
the man-hammer. Neither the man nor the hammer has the capacity to knock in nails, 
but together this assemblage has this capacity. Thus we might suggest that power 
emerges from the assemblage. This shows how cultures can come to have capacities to 
affect the outcome of human will, when conceived of as assemblages: supplements 
adopted into assemblages have the disposition (always, but to varying degrees) that 
they can imbue capacities upon those assemblages; they bring their own capacities and 
in so doing new capacities emerge. Power, (capacity) we might say, is the property 
emergent from the adoption of extensions that imbues assemblages with the capacity to 
affect change. We must point out that this capacity is always in conflict (successful or 
otherwise) with the capacities of others – “[t]he essence of a force is its quantitative 
difference from other forces, and the quality of the force in question is constituted by 
this quantitative difference” (Deleuze 1983:50). When the prison officer joins the force 
he creates a new assemblage, from which process of assembling his power emerges. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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Each day he goes to work he re-assembles that assemblage. That is why he still retains 
that power to constrain his charges when having a cup of tea at work, but loses it when 
he goes home to his family. Moreover, he has significant power because the assemblage 
which he is involved (the membership of which constitutes a supplement to his ‘home 
self’) in constituting is massive, dense, slow (old), practiced; it involves all the 
assemblages of the law, the prison service, the judiciary the government and the state: 
their histories and presents. Power emerges from the formation of assemblages in 
proportion to their scale and durability, and sometimes according to actual physical 
properties.
The Normalizing Power of Institutions and Assemblages
Originating at least in part in the phenomenological account of humans’ 
experience of the world of others alluded to above, what has come to be known as 
‘Symbolic Interactionism’ tells us how social groups bring about the homogenization of 
meanings. Following from our capacity to represent to ourselves both ourselves and 
others as objects, we become aware of differences and similarities between ourselves 
and others who are neither entirely similar nor entirely different. Crucially, because we 
can see similarities between ourselves and others, we can conceive of the way in which 
certain of our behaviours may be viewed by them. That is, we may wish to constitute 
ourselves in a particular way – we may wish to appear like a hip-hop star, for example –
we can view ourselves as the object of the future created by the adoption of the 
supplements – behaviour, dress etc – that would effect this transformation. We can 
conceive of the reaction of others similar to ourselves and we may choose to alter our 
aspirations for ourselves – we may normalize ourselves, we may homogenize our 
behaviour with that of others (behave as territorializing assemblages) every bit as much 
as we may choose to be different (behave as de-territorializing assemblages). The 
expectation of what others are like and how they will behave is known as ‘typification’; 
altering our behaviour to fit in with these typifications is known as ‘behaving to the 
generalized other’. However, neither the typifications nor the behaviour of those typified Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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is fixed, they are negotiated in ‘the situation’ and what those typifications and 
behaviours are altered by the ‘definition of the situation’ – a situation is ‘defined’ as one 
in which certain meanings are agreed upon, meaning that certain behaviours become 
normal or acceptable. The greater the power to define the situation, the greater the 
power to affect certain kinds of behaviour. The more people who internalize those 
norms, the greater the scale and therefore power of that institutional assemblage to 
cause others to internalize those norms. Various qualities of assemblages are involved in 
complex ways, however, by and large, scale, density, slowness, practicedness, all 
contribute to domination of the definition of the situation. Behaviour to the generalized 
other promotes normalization and homogenization of meanings, styles, representations, 
and behaviours. Definition of the situation defines which meanings, styles, 
representations, and behaviours are acceptable, or normal and therefore, by extension, 
those which are unacceptable. The power to normalize is thus self-replicating, giving rise 
to the situation that the power to normalize increases the density of the assemblage 
increasing the power to normalize.
The culture, or sub culture of any group of inmates in a child jail is tiny in 
comparison to the assemblage formed by the prison officer and the prison service. The 
prison officer consequently has greater capacity to impose his definition of the situation. 
The following outline of a data collection method is designed to make visible the 
processes by which the officer controls the definition of the situation, sometimes in the 
face of the will to reject those meanings or rules on the part of the child in his charge.
Methodological Considerations for Researching the Use of 
Restrictive physical Intervention Against Children in Jail
Thus far this paper has advanced a view of the way in which social actors 
structure society – cultures, institutions –  as a “contingent ongoing accomplishment of 
organized artful practices of everyday life”, (Garfinkel 1967:11) in their attempts to 
achieve what they will for themselves as objects of the future. These attempts are 
constrained (post hoc, at least) by events that are bound up with the emergent sense Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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making processes of assemblages. This is the limit of the theoretical methodological 
foundation; if we are to answer the questions surrounding the use of RPI on children in 
jail what must follow is consideration of the empirical – we must return to the things 
themselves. What are the real world technologies that one actor brings to bear upon 
another that limit the achievement of the other’s will towards himself? What practices 
enable the powerful to define the situation as one where another’s adoption of 
supplements to their existing assemblage is deemed appropriate or otherwise? What 
kinds of things do prison officers do to define their situation? How might they do things 
differently in order to obviate the use of RPIs? In short, what “artful practices of 
everyday life” do officers bring to the daily accomplishment of their engagement with 
their charges that might result in resort to RPIs? Conventionally at this point, post-
modern, or post-structural analyses wishing to turn to the actualities of social action 
would appeal to Lacanian psycho-semiotic analysis of flows of desire, or to Foucauldian 
discourse analysis. The problem that I see with this approach in this context is that such 
analyses are designed to reveal the content of discourses and the effect of that content’s 
meaning. What I wish to suggest here is that we should address not merely the meaning 
of words but what is their pragmatic effect in social situations: what it is that words can 
do.  Discourse analysis may reveal the content of discourses by which the powerful 
reproduce inequalities, but it does not show how this happens. Furthermore, what I shall 
propose bellow relies for its coherence on its association with the pragmatic and 
phenomenological account of ‘will’ that I gave above. I recognize that this position is 
entirely defeasable and would welcome the opportunity to respond to any criticism. What 
I shall suggest, however, is that answers to these questions are to be found through 
engagement with the insights of Conversation Analysts.
Speech Acts, Conversation Analysis: What talk can do.
Following from the work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) we are aware that 
words do not merely mean things, they can do things. That is, we might consider the 
capacity of words to do things rather than their property of having meaning. In Speech Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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Acts (1969), Searle separates two elements of speech, namely the “propositional 
content” of any locution, and its “illocutionary force”, that is, what the locution is about
and what the locution does. This follows from Austin’s assertion in How to do things with 
words that locutions, or as he called them, “speech acts” can do things. Thus when the 
priest says, ‘I pronounce you man and wife’ he performs the act of marrying people or of 
declaring that he has married two people. When John says ‘I shan’t be late’ he performs 
the act of promising to be home in time for dinner. When the prison officer says ‘Get that 
poster off the bed!’ he performs the act of ordering the trainee
xv to alter a supplement 
which he has adopted in an attempt to achieve his will towards himself as that object of 
the future who has a poster on the end of his bed. Following from the above and from 
Sacks (1995 and passim) those practicing Conversation Analysis (CA), are of the belief 
that all social processes are instantiated in talk. It follows then, should this claim be 
true, that it is through the use of certain linguistic tools that our prison officers define 
the situation that restricts the becoming of the boys in our child jails: their words do the 
work of defining the situation, and thus of restricting or promoting the adoption of 
certain kinds of supplements (manifest as certain kinds of behaviour) to their existing 
selves.
Conversation analysis is further founded on the work of Garfinkel and the 
methodological programme Ethnomethodology, of which Lynch has said 
‘Ethnomethodology transforms the theoretical problem of order into a descriptive 
orientation to the quotidian production of social order … [in other words,] to document 
the diverse tacit …competences that are part of innumerable organizations of practice.’ 
(2001)  Conversation Analysis has gone some way to achieving this in the circumstance 
where we might believe that such ‘quotidian production of social order’ is achieved 
linguistically. That is, CA seeks to uncover the tacit reasoning procedures and 
sociolinguistic competencies underlying the production and interpretation of talk in 
organised sequences of interaction, in an attempt to unfold the ordering processes thus 
engendered, and therefore the structuring of societies through talk-in-interaction. What I Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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wish to suggest here is that an adaptation of the methods of CA will be revelatory of the 
way in which prison officers structure the self constitutive behaviour of trainees, and that 
it is when negotiations of what constitutes acceptable behaviour exhaust their linguistic 
possibilities, that the negotiation becomes physical and RPIs are one of the officers’ 
legitimised techniques of physical “negotiation”. My suggestion is that the adaptation of 
CA techniques, a suggested account of which follows, will show what these processes 
are.
Conversation analysts conventionally make use of microscopically detailed 
analyses of transcripts of real recordings. Such recordings are not generally obtainable in 
prisons. However, conversation analysts have provided us with a wealth of knowledge 
about different features of talk in interaction. Knowledge of such features should enable 
a suitably trained researcher to identify such features “live” during overt non-
participatory observation. First, however, we should look at some of the features of talk-
in-interaction that conversation analysts have identified.
Talk-in-interaction is said to be structured around the taking of turns and the 
control of that turn-taking. This means that the simplest form of talk-in-interaction is the 
adjacency pair, where one utterance is followed without any kind of disruption by 
another related reply taking its turn. However, not all talk-in-interaction is this simple 
and more complex forms have been identified such as preferred responses, next turn 
proof, overlapping talk, or repair (where conventional “rules” of turn taking are broken) 
for example. Each of these ways of altering the talk from the simple adjacency pair is 
taken to be evidence of something social being done by the locators. Following from 
these and other categories, Hosticka (1979) constructed several categories of talk that 
contributed to assertion of the power to define the situation in a lawyers’ office. 
Hosticka’s paper examined the distribution of the power to define the situation where 
there was significant inequality of power between the professionals and the clients
xvi. The 
kind of linguistic tools for defining the situation that Hosticka identified were events such 
as the following:Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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1. Questions:  The form of questions may be viewed in terms of their expected 
responses (preference).
2. Answers:  Answers may correspond to expected responses or deviate from them.  
They may also avoid answering the question.
3. Changing the Topic:  Subjects previously unintroduced either by way of questions, or 
explicitly or implicitly in answers to questions.
4. Continuation:  Continuation of a previously introduced topic despite intervening 
exchange(s).
5. Return:  Return to a topic introduced by the other party despite intervening 
exchange(s).
6. Leading Questions:  Questions containing their own answers. (more specific than 
dimension 1)
7. Explanation: More or less complete discourses reifying or defining events, for 
example, in the speakers own terms – characterised more or less by an absence of 
interaction. (In the face of deference for example)
8. Imposition:  More or less complete discourses reifying or defining events, for 
example, in the speaker’s own terms, in such a way as to discourage negotiation of 
the topic. (Despite resistance, for example)
9. Instructions: Possibly neutral directions to specific acts.
10.Orders: Imposition of directions to specific acts. (In the face of resistance for 
example.)
In “normal” conversation, speech acts such as those listed above would encounter 
a “repair” response, in the situation where these dominating speech acts are used to 
define the situation, repair is rarely successful. 
Hosticka recorded the interactions and counted the frequency of occurrence of 
each of the categories listed. What I propose as a method of data collection is that overt, 
non-participatory observation is undertaken by researcher(s) who are fully familiar with 
these talk forms and others identified by CA. The researcher should observe the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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interactions between the officers and the boys in the institutions and record with as 
much detail as possible the locutionary and somatic aspects of these interactions. 
Because mechanical or electronic means of recording events are unlikely to be permitted 
by the institution, the researcher would have to do this manually as soon after the event 
as practically possible, ideally immediately. There is a long tradition in covert research of 
taking notes very quickly after events. However, researchers here would need to record 
as accurately as possible the specific detail of exchanges. The purpose of this would be 
to show, or illustrate the kind of talk events that were taking place, and document the 
kind of events that led to the use of RPIs and those that were efficacious in diffusing 
situations. It would then be possible to advise upon the future training of officers in 
techniques that would obviate the use of RPIs. 
We take the view of DiCristina (1995) that no method of inquiry has justifiable 
privilege over another, and thus we would suggest that where the choice of method is 
concerned, the investigator must justify his methods on an individual basis and own 
them and take responsibility for them. Furthermore, it becomes incumbent upon the 
investigator to accept the limitations and benefits of the kind of data produced and thus 
the nature of the claims produced by his analysis. What is important here is that this 
method of investigation is not be designed to test any particular hypothesis, it is not 
designed to prove anything. Consequently the data gathered does not need the rigour 
that conversation analysts have brought to their work, and thus the method of writing up 
after the fact that I propose does not present problems of validity or reliability. The 
method is merely meant, as with Ethnomethodology, to be descriptive. Furthermore, the 
kind of rigour that conversation analysts bring to their work has been because they have 
been at pains to identify certain kinds of linguistic structures are at present in talk-in-
interaction, not to show what these structures are doing in the specific situation. This 
study would focus on the outcome of the linguistic events themselves and thus needs 
only to be able to demonstrate that certain already identified features serve to structure 
social situations in certain ways. This does not require the detailed recording and Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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analysis of the observed talk. There is in addition a certain advantage to working this 
way in that the observer will also be able to observe certain kinds of somatic behaviour 
that conversation analysts ignore. Indeed, in their assertion that all social interaction 
takes place through talk, they deny the existence of – for want of a better term – body 
language. The proposed method will be able to identify the kinds of “body language”  
and its association with certain features of talk that officers employ in their efforts to 
define situations in the way that they will. 
Some Examples
What follow are some examples of the kind of events that I expect this method to 
reveal. They are taken from observations that I have made in a Young Offender 
Institution and in a Magistrates’ Court. The first two examples are presented as a 
contrast to one another to show how different linguistic structures to events can have 
differing outcomes. The first example was recorded by me (in the manner proposed 
above) at a Young Offender Institution in the UK; the second is a fictitious 
representation of a different outcome.
Example 1
1 Officer What’s that poster doing on the end of your bunk?
2 Trainee But we’re allowed posters in us pads.
3 Officer You’re allowed them on your canteen.
4 Trainee That’s not fair, they has them on their bunk in Premiership
xvii.
5 Officer You’re not on premiership.
6 Trainee Yeah but it’s not like … you know … we’re doin any harm nor nuffink
7 an’ anyway its only van Damme, it’s not like its porno nor nuffin
8 Officer Are you going to take that poster down or am I going to do it
9 and give you some
10 Trainee
xviii That’s not fairJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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11 Give you some minus points?
12 That’s not fair. They gets everything on Premiership, they gets
13 burn and shower-gells ((takes down poster)) and they gets to eat in 
their
14 Pads an’ all that, just cos they lick screws – sorry, officers – arses
In this example, the officer is attempting to define the situation – required by the 
large assemblage of the specific Institution – as one where boys only have posters on 
their canteens. The boy is trying to adopt the supplement to his existing self that 
achieves his will towards himself as an object of the future that has a poster on the end 
of his bed. There are one or two immediate events of interest in this example. First it will 
be apparent that most of the talk follows simple, undamaged, adjacency pair sequence 
until line 9 when the trainee interrupts the officer. The officer immediately initiates repair 
with ‘give you some minus points’. The officer’s repair is accepted by the trainee by 
repeating his ‘That’s not fair’. The exchange results in the amicable removal of the 
poster. The following example is fictitious, but it illustrates what could have happened 
had the real officer started his talk with an order. 
Thus:
Example 2
1. Officer:    Harris, take that poster down.
2. Trainee:    Fuck off. 
The order – one of Hostika’s ten linguistic tools of definition of the situation – in 
line one leaves the trainee with little possible verbal response that would constitute a 
reasonable adjacent pair, other than to acquiesce: “OK”. In the circumstance where the 
boy is going to resist the officer’s definition of the situation where he can order the boy 
to take down the poster, “Fuck off” is among a very limited repertoire of possible Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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responses. This negotiation may well be likely to result in a physical conclusion because 
the linguistic possibilities are so easily exhausted when an order is used.
Whilst the following example is not from a prison setting – it was recorded by me 
in a Magistrates court – it is a good illustration of the kind of thing that the proposed 
method will allow us to describe. It illustrates how damage to the sequence of adjacency 
pairs is very rapidly repaired and how, when the definition of the situation is challenged, 
the definition is rapidly re-established. The dramatis personae are as follows: P, 
Prosecuting Counsel; D, Defending Counsel: B, Bench (Magistrate); C, Clark to the 
Justices (the presiding crown official – procedural, legal advisor to the court). 
Prosecuting Counsel has nearly finished her summary when defending council stands and 
says
Example 3
1 D If I may madam
2 P If I may finish
3 C Sit down Mr Proctor (D)
4 B Continue Miss Adams (P)
5 C I:: will read the rules
(3 seconds)
The first startling thing about this exchange is that it took a mere three seconds. 
The first event is that the Defence Counsel stands and starts to speak before the 
Prosecuting Counsel has finished (threatening the definition of the situation as one 
where the Prosecuting Counsel may speak until she’s finished – this incidentally is a 
standard turn taking rule identified by CA). She then interrupts his interruption, initiating 
repair. However, she has broken another rule, and that is that she is not permitted to 
admonish other members of the court. Thus, another repair becomes necessary and the 
Clark to the Justices initiates the necessary repair by interrupting the Prosecution. The 
Magistrate then tells the Defence to sit down, however, this again upsets the definition Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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of the situation as one where the Clark is in charge of procedure, and so she interrupts 
the magistrate, and by her interruption establishes herself as the court’s arbiter. This is 
a clear example of the powerful asserting their capacity to define the situation, and it is 
the contention of this paper that we would not be able to see it and describe it without 
the research method that I adumbrate above.
Conclusion
There is not really a conclusion to this paper: there is nothing to conclude. I 
hope, however, that I have shown sufficiently that if we take to be true of societies what 
I suggest above, then the method that I propose to enable us meaningfully to describe 
the processes of definition of the situation in children’s jails will be effective. I hope that 
such an investigation would be effective in bringing its insights to bear on the training of 
officers in techniques that will reduce the use of RPIs without having to rely upon the 
political will or courage to ban such instruments.
Footnotes
                                                          
i Whilst the use of the term “child” to refer to these young offenders may appear 
emotive, it is the term preferred by professionals in the Secure Estate.
ii apart from the technique which involves inflicting a chop to the bridge of the nose with 
the side of the officer’s hand which has been banned.
iii See Chisholm 1976, O’Connor 2000, or Clarke 2003, for example.
iv For a detailed account of Will, see my 2009a.
v This does not refer to an a priori in the Kantian sense but to an epistemological field 
that constitutes the conditions of possibility of ideas.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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vi Geworfenheit. ‘The expression “thrownness” is meant to suggest the facticity of its 
being delivered over’ (1996:174)
vii Particularly, ‘Structural Anthropology’.
viii Derrida shows that Levi-Strauss’ study is significantly flawed and guilty of 
ethnocentrism.
ix He who is not self-present with me is not me: he is ‘other’ than me. He who is not co-
present with me is a stranger or is ‘other’ than ‘us’ (those who are co-present with me).
x See Deleuze and Guattari 1987:pp. 71, 88-91, 323-37, 399, 503-5 and De Landa 
(2006). A more detailed account of Assemblage Theory and its implications for 
Criminology can be found in my 2009b
xi Actor Network Theorists call these supplements extensions see Callon 1991, 1986a, & 
b, Callon & Latour 1981, Latour 1988 inter alia.
xii I have spoken about this “will to self consummation” and expanded upon it at length 
elsewhere Crewe 2009a
xiii  For Husserl rather than representing to ourselves some real object or other, we 
actively constitute that object.  However, we can only constitute objects that are 
meaningful to us, and we can only constitute those objects that are coherent –
‘compossible’.
xiv We must, of course always remember that there are de-territorializing processes at 
work that can catastrophically disassemble the most (apparently) stable assemblage.
xv Boys in Young Offender Institutions and Secure Training Institutions are frequently 
referred to as trainees.
xvi Similar studies have been conducted in medical institutions studying the distribution of 
power to define the situation between doctors and patients (Kahne, and Schwartz, 1978; Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Crewe
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Kleinman 1982; Levy, 1982) and at the Watergate hearings (Moloch and Boden 1985) 
amongst others.
xvii At the institution concerned the boys were graded according to privileges into 
“classes” named after the leagues of the English football league, i.e. Premiership, 
Championship and 1
st Division.
xviii The symbol to the right indicates overlapping utterances
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